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PLAY THROUGH THE WHISTLE: THE SCOPE OF
ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTION FOR
EMPLOYEE COMPLAINTS PURSUANT TO ERISA
SECTION 510
"There is an old saying: Keep playing until you hear the
whistle.... . Ray Lewis
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the traditional employment relationship, either the employee or
the employer may terminate the relationship for any reason, unless there is

a contrary agreement.'

During the past half-century, American courts

began creating exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine for employee
terminations that violated public policy. 2 Simultaneously, Congress began
enacting statutes in furtherance of various public policy considerations,
providing employees with protection from termination or adverse

employment action for certain types of employee conduct.3 One example
of a federal statute that includes a wrongful discharge cause of action in the
form of an anti-retaliation provision designed to protect employee
whistleblowers is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974

1 See

HORACE

G. WOOD,

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877)

("[A] general or indefinite hiring is primafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it
out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. . . . [Ilit is an indefinite hiring
and is determinable at the will of either party."); Joseph C. Telezinski, Jr., Note, Without
Warning The Danger of Protecting "Whistleblowers" Who Don't Blow the Whistle, 27 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 397, 398-99 (1999-2000) (explaining employment-at-will doctrine applies unless
employment contract is for specified term).
2 See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(adopting public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine). The court found that the
employer wrongfully terminated its employee who it fired for his refusal to commit perjury
before the California legislature. Id. But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380
(Cal. 1988) (rejecting public policy exception to at-will employment rule for internal complaints).
The court reasoned that "[w]hen the duty of an employee to disclose information to his employer
serves only the private interest of the employer, the rationale underlying the [public policy] cause
of action is not implicated." Id; see also Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United
States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 74 (2000) (noting
limitation to public policy exception when public has no interest). Summers asserts that the
exception "may be limited to those situations where the public's health and safety are affected; it
may not apply if only the internal affairs of the employer are involved." Summers, supra,at 74.
3 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(2006).
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("ERISA").4
Section 510 of ERISA provides protection to employees from
termination, suspension, or discrimination in retaliation for providing
information or testimony in any "inquiry or proceeding" related to ERISA.5
The federal circuit courts of appeals have reached different conclusions
regarding the scope of employee action necessary to trigger the antiretaliation provision of ERISA.6 This circuit split has led to inconsistent
remedies for aggrieved plaintiffs who have suffered adverse employment
action, including termination, as a result of internal complaints of alleged
ERISA violations.7 Some circuits have held that an employee must partake
in an actual governmental inquiry or proceeding, or a private suit regarding
the employer's alleged ERISA wrongdoing, to receive ERISA antiretaliation protection.8
Alternatively, other circuits have ruled that
information regarding an ERISA violation that is provided to an employer
internally,
alone suffices to trigger anti-retaliation protection under Section
9
510.

Part II of this Note addresses the history and enactment of ERISA,
and analyzes the statutory language of Section 510 compared to other
codified anti-retaliation provisions. 1° Part III addresses the emergence of a
circuit split among the federal circuit courts of appeals concerning what
employee conduct is protected pursuant to Section 510.11 Part III.A
discusses the circuit court decisions that have held that internal employee

4 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461

(2006)).
5 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act.").
6 See infra Part III.A-B (outlining emerging circuit split over interpretation of Section 510
regarding internal employee complaints).
7 See infra Part III.A-B.
See, e.g., Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011) (holding Section 510 does not protect unsolicited internal
complaints based on plain reading of statute); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325,
328-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding internal complaints must be solicited to constitute inquiry or
proceeding); King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding
"inquir[y] or proceeding[]" suggests limiting protection to information given in formal
proceeding).
9 See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
internal complaints are protected by ERISA Section 510); see also Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw.,
999 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding Section 510 protects employee internal complaints).
10 See infra Part II (outlining history of ERISA's enactment and Section 510's protection
from retaliation).
11 See infra Part III (analyzing emerging circuit split concerning what action warrants
Section 510 protection from retaliation).
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complaints are protected from retaliation, and Part III.B addresses the
circuit decisions that deny protection to employees who complain about
alleged violations of ERISA internally to the employer. 12 Finally, Part IV
analyzes how the United States Supreme Court decision in Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics Corp.,13 which pertains to the scope of the
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") anti-retaliation provision, may catalyze
an eventual Supreme Court decision to resolve the circuit split surrounding
ERISA's anti-retaliation protection.14
This Note concludes that courts should interpret ERISA Section
510 narrowly and consistently with the plain meaning of the statute.15 A
narrow interpretation of Section 510 would continue to protect employees
who report alleged ERISA violations externally to the government, or who
file private law suits. 16 Until the Supreme Court rules on the scope of
Section 510 protection, attorneys should counsel their clients to "play
through the whistle" by reporting alleged violations of ERISA to the
government, or institute a private suit, to obtain protection from

retaliation. 17

II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF ERISA
A. The Enactment ofERISA
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 as a "comprehensive" federal
statute designed to protect employee interests in benefits plans that
employers provide to employees.' 8 Under ERISA, employee benefit plans
include pension plans and welfare plans pertaining to employment. 19
12
13
14
15

See infra Part IIIA-B.
131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
See infra Part IV.E (addressing FLSA circuit split and Supreme Court decision).
See infra Part V (arguing for narrow interpretation of Section 510 protection based on

plain meaning of statutory language).
16 See infra Part V.
17 See infra Part V (counseling attorneys to advise clients to "blow the whistle" and report
alleged ERISA violations externally).
18 See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (stating ERISA applies "federal
regulation [to] plans providing employees with fringe benefits"). An "employee benefit plan"
includes plans that pertain to employee pensions and welfare.
Id. at 90-91; see also

Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 112 (1989) (asserting Congress enacted ERISA to
safeguard employee benefit plans from fund mismanagement and abuse); David Angueira &
David Conforto, Without a Remedy: The Massachusetts Whistleblower's Brush with ERISA, 39
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 955, 956-57 (2006) (stating ERISA enacted in response to plan
mismanagement and other actions blocking retiree fund disbursement).
19 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90-91; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2) (2006) (defining pension plans
to provide deferred employee compensation); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006) (welfare plans include
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Congress included various provisions designed to safeguard benefit plans
and prevent employer abuse in ERISA's broad statutory scheme.2 0 For

example, ERISA mandates pension plan requirements concerning
employee participation, funding, and vesting. 21 The statute also includes
standards regarding the reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duties related to
the management of welfare and pension plans.22 The regulations set forth
under ERISA replaced state laws that were often inconsistent; thus,
ERISA's enactment led to uniformity with the administration and
regulation of various employee benefit plans.23
B. ERISA's Anti-Retaliation Provision:Section 510
One of the measures that Congress implemented in ERISA to
safeguard employee benefit plans and to prevent abuse by employers is the
statute's anti-retaliation provision encompassed in Section 5 10.24 The first
provision of Section 510 prohibits an employer from taking adverse
employment action against an employee who has exercised an entitled right
under a benefit plan, and from interfering with an employee-entitled right
under the plan.25 The second provision of Section 510 prohibits an
employer from taking adverse employment action against an employee
because that individual has provided information or testimony, or plans to
testify, in "any inquiry or proceeding" related to ERISA. 2

Section 510's

benefits covering employee costs associated with "sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment").
20 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) ("Congress included
various safeguards [in ERISA] to preclude abuse and 'to completely secure the rights and
expectations brought into being by this landmark reform legislation."' (quoting S. REP. No. 93127, at 36 (1973))).
21 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (2006)).
22 See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114 (2006)).
23 See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (describing effect of
ERISA's enactment).
24 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
25 See id. (providing anti-retaliation protection relating to employee entitled rights).
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of
any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this
subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
Id.
26

See id. (providing protection from retaliation for employees who report alleged ERISA
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27
purpose is to protect the attainment of employee rights under ERISA.
The focus of this Note is to interpret the second portion of the antiretaliation provision contained in Section 510 and its impact on employees
who report alleged violations of substantive ERISA regulations internally
to an employer.28

C. The Scope of Section 510 in Comparison to Title VII's Anti-retaliation
Provision
While ERISA's anti-retaliation provision provides broad protection
in some circumstances to affected employees-e.g., when an employer
attempts to deny benefits to any employee on a discriminatory basis-the
statute does not provide extensive employee protection compared to other
federal employment statutes with anti-retaliation provisions.29
For
example, Section 704 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196430
extended broad statutory protection to individuals who manifest opposition
internally to the employer regarding any employer action that is unlawful
under Title VII. 3 This Note contends that the anti-retaliation language of
Section 510 of ERISA is limited to external complaints only, and,
therefore, that Section 510 is consequently narrower in scope3than
the more
2
expansive protection afforded under Section 704 of Title VII.

violations).
27 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (stating Section 510
"proscribes interference with rights protected by ERISA").
28 See infra Part III (addressing circuit split over scope of ERISA anti-retaliation provision).
29 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (protecting employees who partake in proceeding or inquiry),
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (providing protection to employees who oppose an employer
action that Act deems unlawful).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). Title VII's anti-retaliation provision captured in Section
704 reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id.
32

See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (reasoning

Congress could have provided broader protection for employee internal complaints similar to
Title VII).
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D. StatutoryInterpretation:GeneralPrinciples
The Supreme Court has established the general rule that statutory
language should be regarded as conclusive unless Congress has manifested

a clear intent otherwise.33 The first step in statutory analysis is determining
whether the language is clear and has unambiguous meaning.3 4 If a court
determines that the language is ambiguous on its face, it will then look to
the surrounding language as well as the contextual application of the text.35
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT SURROUNDING PROTECTABLE EMPLOYEE
ACTION UNDER ERISA
The federal circuit courts of appeals that have interpreted the
protection afforded to employees who make internal complaints to
36
employers under ERISA Section 510 have reached divergent outcomes.
Some circuits have found that internal employee complaints made to
employers regarding alleged violations of ERISA alone merit protection
under the anti-retaliation provision in Section 510.3 7 In contrast, other
circuits have denied ERISA anti-retaliation protection to employees who
only complained internally to their employer about alleged violations of the

33 See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (addressing
role of Court in statutory interpretation). The Court asserted that "[albsent a clearly expressed
legislative intention to the contrary ... [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive." Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,
108 (1980)); see also Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 2005)
(explaining courts presume statutory text to be read in accordance with its plain meaning) (citing
BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)).
34 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (stating first step in statutory
interpretation). The Court has concluded that statutory language is ambiguous when "reasonably
susceptible of different interpretations." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985).
35 See Atchison, 470 U.S. at 473 n.27 (setting forth measure courts take to interpret
ambiguous statutory language); see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131
S. Ct. 1325, 1330 (2011) ("[Ilnterpretation ... 'depends upon reading the whole statutory text,
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities
that inform the analysis."' (quoting Dolanv. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006))).
36 See Jessica Barclay-Strobel, Comment, Shooting the Messenger: How Enforcement of
FLSA and ERISA isThwarted by Courts' Interpretations of the Statutes' Antiretaliation and
Remedies Provisions,58 UCLAL. REv. 521, 523-24 (2010) (recognizing existence of circuit split
regarding protection of internal employee complaints related to ERISA).
37 See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding
discharge of employee for providing information relating to ERISA within Section 51 O's scope);
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding effectiveness of antiretaliation provision contingent upon ability to protect internal employee complaints).
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statute .38
A. UnsolicitedInternal Complaints Constitute ProtectedAction Pursuantto
Section 510 of ERISA Fifth and Ninth Circuits
The first federal circuit to consider whether Section 510 of ERISA
provided protection to employees who made internal complaints to their
employers regarding ERISA wrongdoing was the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii.39 The
plaintiff in Hashimoto asserted that, on several occasions, she complained
internally about alleged violations of ERISA's requirements regarding
reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary duties. 40 The court held that the
plaintiffs state-law cause of action for wrongful discharge based on this
internal reporting was preempted by ERISA's broad preemption provision,
and that ERISA in fact provided the remedy pursuant to Section 5 10. 4 1 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that the intent behind the anti-retaliation provision
of ERISA was to provide protection to whistle blowers, including an
individual in the plaintiffs position, who made internal complaints about
the alleged ERISA wrongdoing on the part of the employer, and who was
subsequently fired for protesting the alleged violation. 2
38

See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding

Section 510 does not protect unsolicited internal complaints from retaliation based on statute's
language); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding internal
complaint not "proceeding," and must be solicited to constitute "inquiry"); King v. Marriott Int'l,
Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding "inquiry or proceeding" limits protection to
information given in formal proceeding).
39 999 F.2d 408, 409 (9th Cir. 1993) (considering whether employee internal complaint
ERISA violation could raise state claim of wrongful discharge).
40 See id. at 409-10 (outlining internal complaints plaintiff made to supervisors regarding
alleged ERISA violations committed by bank). The plaintiff's specific internal complaints
alleging violations of ERISA pertained to profit-sharing, severance, and pension plans. Id. at
410.
41 See id. at 411 (finding preemption because claim would force court to adjudicate claims
related to ERISA).
42 See id. (finding Section 510 of ERISA protects internal complaints of ERISA violations
made to employer). The court described the proper procedural steps taken by an employee to
provide information regarding ERISA violations that may lead to adverse employment action
against the employee at the hands of the employer. Id.
The normal first step in giving information or testifying in any way that
might tempt an employer to discharge one would be to present the problem
first to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan. If one is then
discharged for raising the problem, the process of giving information or
testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatory discharge discourages the
whistle blower before the whistle is blown.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed
the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit when it decided Anderson v. Electronic
Data Systems Corp.43 The plaintiff in Anderson was a cash fund manager
responsible for approximately $1.3 billion in investments.44 He alleged that
the defendant employer asked him to commit illegal acts under ERISA.45
He contended that his employer discharged him for refusing to violate the
law and for his internal reporting of those illegal requests and other illegal
conduct committed by a colleague.46 Analogous to the court's reasoning in
Hashimoto, the Anderson court held that the plaintiff's state law cause of
action for wrongful termination was preempted by ERISA. 47 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that ERISA's anti-retaliation provision found in Section
510 provided the appropriate cause of action. 48 The court further held that
Section 510 broadly proscribes adverse employment action or discharge
when an employee has "given information" related to ERISA.49
B. UnsolicitedInternal Complaints Do Not Merit Protection under Section
510 of ERISA Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits
More recent decisions across the federal circuits have opposed the

Id.
43 11 F.3d 1311, 1312 (5th Cir. 1994) (considering whether plaintiff could raise state law
retaliation claim regarding discharge for reporting ERISA violation).
44 See id. (outlining plaintiff's job title and employment responsibilities to defendant).
Anderson's position before his alleged wrongful termination was "Manager of Investments and
Debt in the Domestic Treasury Department." Id. Anderson was responsible for all "domestic
short and long-term investments for all pension portfolios, corporate portfolios and Title IX
portfolios." Id.
45 See id. (detailing alleged ERISA violations plaintiff reported internally to employer). The
plaintiff alleged that he was asked to sign invoices for payment regarding pension portfolios
without approval by the trustees of the pension plan. Id. Plaintiff also alleged that he was asked
to record minutes for retirement plan meetings that he did not attend. Id. Finally, the plaintiff
alleged that a co-worker, who dealt directly with the plans that the plaintiff managed and
supervised, committed other ERISA wrongdoing. Id. at 1312-13.
46 See id. at 1312-13 (explaining plaintiff's retaliation claim). The plaintiff alleged that his
employer demoted him from his investment manager position and that he was ultimately
discharged for refusing to commit acts made illegal under ERISA, as well as for reporting
internally the ERISA violations a co-worker had committed. Id. at 1313.
41 Id at 1313-14 (holding plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim preempted because
it
pertained to alleged violations of ERISA). The court reasoned that the alleged retaliation was
directly related to the plaintiff's internal complaint regarding ERISA violations. Id.
48 Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313-14 (reasoning Anderson's claims fell within scope of Section
510); see also Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1985) (disallowing state law
claim as inconsistent with Congressional purpose creating uniformity regarding employee
benefits plans).
49 Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 (finding broad protection for employees who provide
information internally of ERISA violations).
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reasoning outlined in the earlier Fifth and Ninth Circuit opinions, which
discussed whether ERISA Section 510 protection is triggered by an
employee's internal complaint. 50 The first federal circuit to hold that
employee internal complaints do not trigger anti-retaliation protection
pursuant to Section 510 was the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in King v. Marriott International,Inc.51 The plaintiff in
King held various positions in the benefits department of the defendant
employer, including Vice President of Benefits Resources, before the
employer discharged her. 52 The plaintiff contended that her discharge was
due to her objection on multiple occasions to the transfer of monies from a
medical benefit fund to a general corporate fund, and that her discharge
violated public policy in the State of Maryland. 53 The King court held that
the district court erred in finding the plaintiffs state law cause of action
preempted by ERISA's preemption provision.5 4 The Fourth Circuit further
concluded that Section 510 did not provide any protection for the plaintiff s
actions because
the plaintiff did not participate in any inquiry or
55
proceeding.

50

Compare Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313-14 (finding employee discharge for providing

information relating to ERISA within scope of Section 510), and Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw.,
999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding effectiveness of anti-retaliation provision contingent
upon ability to protect employee internal complaints), with Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc.,
610 F.3d 217, 218 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding based on statute's language Section 510 does not
protect unsolicited internal complaints from retaliation), Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402
F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding internal complaint not a proceeding and must be solicited
to constitute inquiry), and King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding "inquiry or proceeding" suggests limited protection to information given in formal
proceeding).
51 337 F.3d at 423 (considering whether ERISA preempted plaintiff's state law claim or if
ERISA provided remedy).
52 Id. at 423 (highlighting plaintiff's responsibilities with defendant employer). Plaintiff's
responsibilities included monitoring the finances of the benefit plans. Id.
53 Id. (outlining plaintiff's state law cause of action for wrongful discharge). Plaintiff
continually objected to the transfer of funds from the medical benefit plan into the corporation's
general account. Id.
54 Id. at 428 (concluding plaintiff's state claim not completely preempted because ERISA did
not provide remedy).
" Id. at 427-28 (holding Section 510 protection triggered only when employee participates in
formal legal or administrative proceeding). The court explained that the language in Section 510,
including "testified or is about to testify," suggests that the language "inquiry or proceedings"
requires employee participation in a formal legal or administrative process to trigger protection
from retaliation. Id. at 427. The court further reasoned that Section 510 provides employees with
less protection than the anti-retaliation provision found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id; see also Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding
FLSA did not provide broad anti-retaliation protection). The court reasoned that the more narrow
language in the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is comparable to the language in Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision and called for a similarly narrow interpretation of the scope of FLSA
protection. Id. The court in Ball found that "proceeding" referenced a legal or administrative
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The Second Circuit considered whether Section 510 protects
internal employee complaints in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.5 6 The
plaintiff in Nicolaou served as the human resources director for the
defendant employer before her termination.57 The plaintiff discovered a
problem with the employer's payroll regarding the underpayment of
overtime wages that resulted in the underfunding of 401(k) benefits to
employees. 58 She attempted to rectify the issue by reporting it to the
company's Controller, Chief Financial Officer, and company attorney, and
by meeting with the company's president, before the company terminated
her employment. 59 The Second Circuit overruled the district court's
decision that Section 510 did not protect employee participation in an
informal internal inquiry, and held instead that solicited internal complaints
may trigger Section 510 protection from retaliation. 60 However, the court
limited its holding by concluding that the plaintiff s actions would fall into
Section 510's anti-retaliation protection for employees who partake in an
inquiry only if the plaintiff's meeting with the employer's president had
been initiated by the employer and not by the plaintiff6i
In Edwards v.A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed the issue of what action suffices to2
6
trigger the anti-retaliation provision contained in Section 510 of ERISA.

process rather than an internal complaint to an employer. Id.
56 402 F.3d 325, 327-28 (2d Cir. 2005) (considering whether district court erred in
dismissing plaintiff's Section 510 claim).
57 Id. at 326 (outlining plaintiff's position with defendant-employer).
fiduciary of, and participant in, the employer's 401(k) plan. Id.
58 Id.(detailing alleged ERISA violations plaintiff discovered).

Plaintiff was a

'9 Id. at 326-27 (outlining steps plaintiff took in reporting alleged ERISA violations
internally).
60 Id. at 328-29 (reasoning Section 510 is "unambiguously broader in scope" than
comparable FLSA section). The court relied on the terms "any inquiry or proceeding" in Section
510, which indicated a less formal connotation than the term "proceeding" found in the
comparable FLSA anti-retaliation provision. Id. The court asserted that the term "inquiry"
demonstrates the intent of Congress to protect participants in informal information gathering. Id.
The court also highlighted how the use of both the terms "inquiry" and "proceeding" is indicative
of Congress's intent "to give the nouns their separate, normal meanings." Id. at 329 (citing
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73 (1984)); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1324 (9th
ed. 2009) (defining term "proceedings" as "the regular and ordinary progression of a law suit");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "inquiry" as "[a] request for
information").
61 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330 (reasoning plaintiff's meeting with company president
constituted inquiry if solicited by employer). The court elucidated that the proper analysis is
whether the situation may be fairly considered to be an "inquiry" and not the degree of formality.
Id. But see id.at 330-31 (Pooler, J., concurring) (asserting plan fiduciaries are entitled to more
protection pursuant to Section 510). The concurring opinion reasoned that fiduciaries have a duty
to ensure the proper and appropriate functioning of the plan. Id. at 331.
62 610 F.3d 217, 218 (3d Cir. 2010) (considering whether employee's internal unsolicited
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In Edwards, the employer hired the plaintiff to create a human resources
department and to serve as Human Resources Director. 63 The plaintiff
contended that her employer terminated her in violation of Section 510 for
complaining to her superiors about alleged ERISA violations including
discrimination in the administration of the health care plan.64 The Third
Circuit held that internal complaints, which are not solicited by the
employer, are not protected from retaliation under Section 510.65 The court
reasoned that the protection of Section 510's inquiry clause covers
employees who provided information in an inquiry,
not employees who
66
inquiry.
own
their
through
information
received
C. Statutory Interpretation:PlainMeaning of Section 510
The common issue pertaining to the circuit split regarding the
scope of ERISA's anti-retaliation protection is the interpretation of the
phrase "inquiry or proceeding" in the text of Section 510.67 More
specifically, the question that courts have addressed is whether information
provided by employees internally to their employers constitutes

report to management of ERISA violation triggers anti-retaliation protection).
63 Id. (highlighting terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment).
64 Id.at 219 (detailing plaintiff's allegations of ERISA violations). The plaintiff specifically
alleged that the defendant-employer did not accurately represent the cost of group health care in
an attempt to deter employees from enrolling in the health care plan. Id. The plaintiff also
alleged that the employer enrolled non-citizens in benefit plans through use of fraudulent social
security identification numbers that were provided to insurance companies. Id.
65 Id. at 218.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that her unsolicited internal
complaints and objections constituted an inquiry. Id. at 223. The court reasoned that the
language "testified or is about to testify" indicates that the terms "inquiry or proceeding" pertain
to formal actions. Id. (quoting King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003)).
The court compared the language of Section 510 to the analogous anti-retaliation provision of
Title VII, which protects employees who oppose unlawful employer actions. Id. at 223-24. The
court concluded that Title VII provides for broader protection from retaliation than ERISA. Id.
66 Id. at 223 (reasoning that the plaintiff's objections were statements and not requests for
information). The court concluded that the language of Section 510 was clear and unambiguous;
thus, it was not necessary to analyze the congressional intent behind the anti-retaliation provision.
Id.at 224. The court further noted that Congress could have expanded the protection afforded by
Section 510 if it included broader anti-retaliation language comparable to Title VII. Id. The
court also concluded that, because the protection afforded under the FLSA is not identical to
language found in Section 510, decisions pertaining to the anti-retaliation provision in the FLSA
are not dispositive. Id.at 224-25.
67 See, e.g., Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222 (considering whether information plaintiff gave to
management was in an inquiry or proceeding); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325,
328-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (defining scope of statutory terms "inquiry" and "proceeding"); King v.
Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (considering scope of statutory language
"inquiry or proceeding").
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participation in an "inquiry or proceeding., 68 For example, the King court
refused to extend Section 510's anti-retaliation protection to employees
who filed internal complaints because the complaints did not involve
participation in an "inquiry or proceeding," which the court concluded
connotes a higher degree of formality than a complaint to an employee's
supervisor. 69 Conversely, the Nicolaou court held that the proper analysis
is to determine whether the circumstances surrounding the production of
information constituted an "inquiry," rather than to assess the degree of
formality. 70
The Edwards court denied anti-retaliation protection by
holding that an "inquiry" is defined as a "request for information," but
based on the facts before the court, the employer did not request the
information the plaintiff provided. 7 '
Circuits that have extended anti-retaliation protection to individuals
who file internal complaints have examined the statutory language of
Section 510 with a passing glance .72 More recent arguments for a broad

68 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222 (exploring whether plaintiff complained in "inquiry or
proceeding").
69 King, 337 F.3d at 427 (finding language of Section 510, read together, leads to degree of

formality). The court stated that "the use of the phrase 'testified or is about to testify' does
suggest that the phrase 'inquiries or proceedings' referenced in section 510 is limited to the legal
or administrative, or at least to something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a
supervisor." Id.
70 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330 (considering what constitutes an inquiry). The court
stated that
the "proper focus is not on the formality or informality of the circumstances under which an
individual gives information, but rather on whether the circumstances can fairly be deemed to
constitute an 'inquiry."' Id. The court further stated that the proper analysis of the meaning of
the terms "inquiry" and "proceeding" was done independently, and those terms were not
considered in light of other statutory terms present in Section 510, such as language that
referenced "testimony." Id. at 330 n.3. The court highlighted the congressional determination to
include both the term "inquiry" and "proceeding" in Section 510, as opposed to the congressional
determination to include only the term "proceeding" in the language of FLSA Section 15(a)(3), as
the intention of Congress to give these terms "their separate, normal meanings." Id. at 329 (citing
Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70,73 (1984)).
71 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (basing denial of plaintiffs claim on circumstances and not
degree of formality). The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that assertions made to
management were the inquiry themselves, reasoning that the plaintiff did not provide evidence
that anyone approached her for information, but rather that she willfully provided information
that was not requested. Id. The court further found that the plaintiff's complaints were
statements and not questions, and that Section 510 provides protection to employees who "give[]
information" and not to employees who receive information. Id. The court concluded that the
scope of the statutory term inquiry covers "inquiries made of an employee, not inquiries made by
an employee." Id.
72 See Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding ERISA
Section 510 "clearly meant to protect whistleblowers"). The court asserted that the statute "may
be fairly construed to protect a person in[the plaintiff's] position if, in fact, she was fired because
she was protesting a violation of law in connection with an ERISA plan." Id; see also Anderson
v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994) (classifying Section 510 as broad
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interpretation of Section 510 are based on the notion that ERISA is a
remedial statute .7' However, the Third Circuit in Edwards rejected the

argument for a broad interpretation of Section 5 10 based on ERISA's status
as a remedial statute because it found that Section 5 10 was unambiguous.
D. ERISA Preemption of State Law Claims
Circuits that deny Section 510's anti-retaliation protection to
employees who complain internally are likely to leave such employees
without any recourse, particularly if that circuit also rules that ERISA
preempts state law anti-retaliation claims. 75 Plaintiffs in this particular
context are likely left without a cause of action because Section 514(a) of
ERISA expressly preempts any state law claims that are related to an
employee benefit plan governed by ERISA.76 The United States Supreme

Court has not yet decided whether a state law cause of action against an
employer-as a result of discipline or discharge for making a complaint
regarding alleged ERISA wrongdoing-is preempted by Section 514(a);
however, the Court has decided a similar issue in favor of preemption of a

prohibition against adverse employment action for providing ERISA related information).
71 See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (addressing plaintiff's argument for broad statutory
reading). The plaintiff and the amicus curiae argued that because ERISA is a "remedial statute,"
Section 510 should be "liberally construed in favor of protecting the participants in employee
benefits plans." Id. (citing IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d
118, 127 (3d Cir. 1986)). However, the court rejected this argument based on its determination
that the statutory language was clear and unambiguous. Id. at 223-24 (citing Wolk v. Unum Life
Ins. of Am., 186 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1999)).
74 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223-24 (rejecting plaintiff's argument for broad reading stating
statute was clear and unambiguous). The court concluded that where there is a clear statutory
provision, the analysis does not need to delve into congressional intent. Id. at 224. The court
reasoned that if Congress was concerned that Section 510 would lead to a lack of protection for
internal employee complainants, it could have implemented more expansive language similar to
the protection provided by Title VII. Id.
75 See Barclay-Strobel, supra note 36, at 541-42 (describing how ERISA preemption of state
retaliation claims lead to a lack of remedy). See generally Anguiera & Conforto, supra note 18,
at 956-57 (concluding ERISA preemption of state claims for wrongful discharge leaves plaintiffs
without a remedy).
76 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006) (promulgating ERISA's express preemption provision). Section
514(a) reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title.
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state law cause of action, claiming that an employee was wrongfully
terminated to prevent the attainment of entitled benefits under an ERISA
plan. 77 In that case, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs claim, which
alleged that the employer illegally discharged the plaintiff to prevent the
collection of pension benefits, was related to an ERISA-regulated plan

within the meaning of Section 514(a), and, thus, was subject to
preemption. 78 The Court reasoned that a law is related to an ERISA plan if
it correlates to, or references the benefit plan, and that Section 514(a)'s

broad language preempts state law even when the state law does not have a
direct affect on an ERISA plan. 79 The Court noted that the mere enactment
of a federal regulatory statute, even if fairly comprehensive, does not

mandate state law preemption.80

Rather, the Court stressed the need for

"'special features' warranting pre-emption" in order to find that a federal
regulatory scheme preempts state law. 8 ' The Court further explained that
77 See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 135 (1990) (outlining issue before
Court). "This case presents the question whether [ERISA] ... pre-empts a state common law
claim that an employee was unlawfully discharged to prevent his attainment of benefits under a
plan covered by ERISA." Id.
78 Id. at 140 (setting forth holding of the court). "'[W]hen it is clear or may fairly be

assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected' by § 510 of ERISA,
'due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield."' Id. at 145
(quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.8 (1988)). "Had
Congress intended to restrict ERISA's pre-emptive effect to state laws purporting to regulate plan
terms and conditions, it surely would not have done so by placing the restriction in an adjunct
definition section while using the broad phrase 'relate to' in the pre-emption section itself." Id. at
141. The Court established that ERISA preemption is applicable to a state law cause of action
that clashes with ERISA or sets forth an additional enforcement instrument. N.Y. State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657-58
(1995). But see Barclay-Strobel, supra note 36, at 541 ("Some scholars and district courts
contend that state law wrongful discharge claims arising from complaints of ERISA violations are
too tenuously related to ERISA to be preempted.").
79 See McClendon, 498 U.S. at 139 (reasoning ERISA's broad preemption provision
preempts laws that do not directly affect ERISA plans). "The key to § 514(a) is found in the
words 'relate to.' Congress used those words in the broad sense, rejecting more limited preemption language that would have made the clause 'applicable only to state laws relating to the
specific subjects covered by ERISA."' Id. at 138 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 98 (1983)). The Court also highlighted Congress's intent for Section 514(a) to serve as a
broad mandate applicable to "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having
the effect of law." Id. at 139 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (2006)); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co.
v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (asserting Congress made Section 514 expansive to "establish
pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern" (quoting Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981))).
80 See McClendon, 498 U.S. at 143 (emphasizing more than just existence of federal statute
necessary for preemption).
81 Id. (finding Section 502(a)'s civil enforcement provision constitutes "special feature"
warranting preemption); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) ("The
policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the
federal scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries

2012]

ERISA SECTION 510

Section 514(a) preempted the state law in question because Congress
intended ERISA to guarantee that employee benefits plans across state
jurisdictions would be regulated pursuant to a consistent set of laws
pertaining to employee benefits.82
This emphasis on consistency is
particularly warranted with anti-retaliation provisions, which vary across
state jurisdictions due to state public policy concerns."'
E. ERISA CircuitSplit ConcerningPreemptionof State Law Retaliation
Claims
In addition to the circuit split concerning conduct that triggers
Section 510's anti-retaliation protection, there is an interrelated circuit split
pertaining to whether ERISA preempts state wrongful discharge claims
brought by employees who have filed internal complaints to the employer
alleging a violation of ERISA.84 The circuit courts of appeals that have
ruled in favor of preemption of state law claims for retaliatory discharge

were free to obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA."); Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) ("The six carefully integrated civil enforcement
provisions found in § 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted ...provide strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate
expressly.").
82 McClendon, 498 U.S. at 142. The Court highlighted the congressional intent in enacting
Section 514(a) to avoid inconsistencies that could lead to "inefficiencies ...to the detriment of
plan beneficiaries." Id. "Particularly disruptive is the potential for conflict in substantive law. It
is foreseeable that state courts, exercising their common law powers, might develop different
substantive standards applicable to the same employer conduct, requiring the tailoring of plans
and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction." Id.
83 Compare Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2011)
(providing expansive anti-retaliation protection to employees), with TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 554.002 (West 2004) (providing whistleblower protection only to public employees), Sabine
Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (recognizing public policy exception
to at-will employment only when employee refuses to perform unlawful conduct), and BarclayStrobel, supra note 36, at 524-25 (illuminating lack of state law claim for internal complainants in
Texas). The New Jersey legislature decided to codify the state's public policy exception to the atwill employment doctrine by providing protection from employer retaliation to an employee who:
Discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an
activity, policy or practice of the employer, or another employer, with whom
there is a business relationship, that the employee reasonably believes ... is
in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law

§ 34:19-3.
84 See Edwards v. A.H.Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing
different outcomes regarding preemption among federal circuit courts of appeals); see also
Anguiera & Conforto, supra note 18, at 974-75 (outlining circuits that have ruled for and against
preemption of state law retaliation claims).
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have based each ruling on the decision set forth in McClendon."' In
Hashimoto, the Ninth Circuit concluded that ERISA preempted the
plaintiff's state law cause of action for wrongful termination because
resolution of the state law claim would have demanded resolution of issues
related to ERISA.8 6 Likewise, in Anderson, the court concluded that
ERISA preempted the plaintiffs retaliatory termination claim because the
plaintiff based the claim on his objections to the alleged ERISA violations
and his complaint to the employer.8 7 Conversely, in King, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff s state

law retaliatory termination cause of action was not completely preempted.88
F. Lesson Learned The Implications and PublicPolicy Considerationsof
Sarbanes-Oxley on ERISA
One federal statute recently enacted in response to widespread
corporate malfeasance, and which could have far reaching implications on
ERISA, is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.89 At least two scholars have drawn a
parallel between corporate governance and investment issues, and issues
pertaining to employee pensions. 90 One specific correlation, which led to
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, is the "lack of transparency and
accountability" that pertains to ERISA and the regulations preceding

See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1313 (5th Cir. 1994) (asserting
McClendon is guiding decision); see also Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 412 (9th
Cir. 1993) (finding preemption because state claim related to ERISA).
86 Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (holding state law retaliatory discharge claim related to
ERISA). The court noted that the "breadth of ERISA preemption is considerable." Id. at 410.
The court reasoned that preemption was applicable to the state law claim because a decision on
the claim would entail interpretation of ERISA, and that ERISA itself provided the plaintiff with
a remedy under Section 510. Id. at 410-11
87 Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314 (asserting state law claim is related to ERISA plan). The court
elucidated that the plaintiff's "claim falls squarely within the ambit of ERISA." Id. (quoting
McClendon, 498 U.S. at 142). The court also noted that enforcement of the state law cause of
action for retaliatory discharge would conflict with sections 502(a) and 510 of ERISA. Id.
88 King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003) (ruling against complete
preemption).
89 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
85

90 See Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 563, 564 (2006) (comparing corporate governance issues with ERISA

issues). "In particular, the accounting scandals of the 1990s as well as the savings-and-loan
disaster of the 1980s bear a striking resemblance to the corporate misdeeds underlying the
unfolding pension crisis." Id. "Just as the lack of transparency and accountability in the
accounting context encouraged the malfeasance that prompted economic setbacks and even
bankruptcy, so too has the obfuscation and evasion afflicting pension practices undermined
pension security and even caused outright default." Id. at 592.
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Sarbanes-Oxley. 91

Intensifying the lack of clarity for pensioners is the degree of
complexity in ERISA's mandates.92 The reality is that employees are most
often devoid of sufficient knowledge or understanding of their rights and

their employer's duties under ERISA. 93

Exacerbating that lack of

transparency and accountability is an ERISA provision allowing employers
to serve as the ERISA plan administrator, which ultimately94 leads to the
potential for a conflict of interest on the part of the employer.

Some scholars fear that inaction on the part of both Congress and
the courts to remedy issues regarding employee pensions could have a

worse impact on the national economy than the instances of corporate
malfeasance. 95

The basis for this public policy concern-similar to the

issues that first led to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley-is the importance
of pension benefit plans to the public at-large, because it pertains to
millions of American employees.

96

Although employees often do not have

91 See id.at 564 ("[T]he lack of transparency and accountability that drove the corporate-

governance and savings-and-loan scandals also underlies the emerging pension debacle.").
92 See id.
at 587 ("Although ERISA purports to mandate clarity of pension rights and plan
obligations, the reality is often unfortunately different."); see also Ann C. Bertino, Comment, The
Need for a Mandatory Award of Attorney 's Fees for PrevailingPlaintiffs in ERISA Benefits
Cases, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 904 n.253 (1992) (highlighting ERISA's complexity). "ERISA

is so complex that many attorneys hesitate to learn the statute. It is unrealistic to expect that the
average lay person could enforce his or her rights under ERISA without assistance." Bertino,
supra, at 904 n.253.
93 See Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 590 (highlighting employees' limited ERISA
knowledge). "[O]rdinary employees with a stake in a pension plan do not necessarily have the
technical knowledge to fully understand the legal requirements and the consequences of various
corporate actions." Id. See generally Colleen E. Medill, The IndividualResponsibility Model of
RetirementPlans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 63-73 (2000).

9' See 29 U.S.C. §1108(c)(3) (2006) (permitting employer administered benefit funds);
Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 589-90 (recognizing employer-administered benefit plans
have potential for conflict of interest). "Indeed, the statutory scheme - by its express terms and
how it has been subsequently interpreted by federal courts - invites the opportunistic behavior that
eventually took down the likes of Enron and Andersen." Id.
at 590.
95 See Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 564 (noting Congress and courts have
recognized crucial role pensions play in national economy). "[T]he fundamental shortcomings of
the ERISA statutory scheme make it unlikely that the pension system can be saved from eventual
ruin without the implementation of radical reforns." Id.at 591.
96 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006) (recognizing importance of benefit plans for American
employees). ERISA asserts the congressional finding that "the continued well-being and security
of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these [employee benefits]
plans; that they are affected with a national public interest; that they have become an important
factor affecting the stability of employment and the successful development of industrial relations
.... Id.; see also Cummins
.
& Nikolai, supra note 90, at 564 ("[Plensions play a pivotal role in
securing the economic and social well-being of tens of millions of retirees and their families.").
"Given the magnitude of the assets involved and the millions of families affected by the fate of
the United States' pension system, the stakes are high." Id.at 567; see also Jane D. Bailey, Tenth
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the knowledge or understanding sufficient to remedy ERISA violations,
two scholars have argued that employees are in the best position to
discover and report alleged improprieties perpetrated by the employer, and,
thus, should be granted broader protection by Congress,
similar to the anti97
retaliation protections promulgated in Sarbanes-Oxley.
G. Implications of the Supreme Court's FLSA Decision in Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics Corp. on the PotentialResolution of the
ERISA CircuitSplit
The most recent Supreme Court decision to consider the scope of a
federal anti-retaliation provision was Kasten v. Saint-GobainPerformance
PlasticsCorp.,98 which analyzed the scope of employee protection pursuant
to the FLSA. 99 The Court in Kasten specifically addressed whether the
statutory language "filed any complaint," as found in Section 215(a)(3) of
the FLSA, included an employee's verbal complaints. 00 In Kasten, the
plaintiff asserted that he complained verbally to his employer about timeclocks located in an area that prevented employees from receiving
compensation for all hours worked; also, he alleged that his employer
terminated his employment as a result of this internal verbal complaint.'10
The district court granted summary judgment for the employer
based on the rationale that the FLSA did not provide anti -retaliation

CircuitSurvey: ERISA Preemption, 74 DENy. U. L. REv. 473, 473 (1997) (noting importance of
employee benefit plans); Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The Window of
Vulnerability for Surviving Spouses Under ERISA, 76 IOWA L. REv. 431, 433 n.12 (1991)

(discussing importance of pension system).
97 See Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 599-600 ("As Congress recognized in enacting
Sarbanes-Oxley, employees are often the best situated to learn about and report evident
illegalities by companies."). Currently, neither ERISA, nor state law protect employees from
retaliation for internal reporting of alleged ERISA violations because ERISA fails to provide a
remedy, and state anti-retaliation claims are preempted. Id. at 599.
98 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011).
99 Id. at 1329 (considering what employee action triggers anti-retaliation protection under
FLSA).
100 Id. at 1330 (setting forth anti-retaliation protection provided under FLSA). The statute
does not allow employers "to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to [the Act], or has testified or is about to testify in such proceeding,
or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee." Id. at 1329 (alteration in original)
(quoting § 215(a)(3)).
101Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1329-30 (setting forth employee's cause of action for retaliation).
Kasten alleged that he complained verbally about the placement of the time-clocks to his
supervisor, his lead operator, the manager of human resources, and the manager of operations. Id.
Kasten also claimed that these verbal, internal complaints to company officials led to his

discipline and termination. Id. at 1330.
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protection to employees for oral complaints. 10 2 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling,
agreeing that oral complaints did not trigger FLSA protection from
employer retaliation. 103 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the scope of anti-retaliation protection under the FLSA and, more narrowly,
to determine whether courts should provide protection from retaliation to
employees who make oral complaints.4
To interpret the statutory phrase "filed any complaint" in the
FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, the Court considered the statute's
context and purpose. 105 This manner of interpretation led the Court to
conclude that oral complaints by employees may trigger the FLSA antiretaliation provision. 10 6 However, the Court limited its decision to the

narrow issue of whether oral complaints trigger statutory anti-retaliation
protection, and expressly refused to address whether internal complaints
trigger the anti-retaliation protection or whether an employee was required
to file a complaint with a government agency or initiate a court
proceeding.1 07 The Court reasoned that consideration and resolution of the
issue as to whether internal employer complaints were covered by the
FLSA, or whether the employee was required to file with the government,
was not "predicate to an intelligent resolution" of the issue of whether oral

complaints triggered the statute's protection.18

102

Kastenv. Saint-GobainPerformance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 613 (W.D. Wis.

2008), aff'd 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011) (holding
plaintiff's oral complaint not protected under FLSA).
103 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 838-40 (7th Cir.
2009), vacated and remanded 131 S.Ct. 1325 (2011) (affirming district court's decision that
verbal complaints do not warrant anti-retaliation protection).
104 Kasten, 131 S.Ct. at 1330 (granting certiorari for purpose of resolving circuit split).
105 Id. ("[I]nterpretation... 'depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the
purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the
analysis.'" (quoting Dolan v.U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006))).
106 Id. at 1336 (holding oral complaints protected by the FLSA).
The Court noted that
"legislators, administrators, and judges have all sometimes used the word 'file' in conjunction
with oral statements." Id. at 1331. The Court recognized that other federally enacted regulations
have also permitted the filing of oral complaints. Id. at 133 1-32. The Court also noted judicial
decisions contemporaneous with the enactment of the FLSA to conclude that oral filings of
complaints were allowed at the time by judges across various jurisdictions and contexts. Id. at
1332. Finally, the Court's analysis culminated in a review of the statutory purpose and
objectives the protection of employees' minimum working conditions, and the reliance of
employee assistance in achieving that goal-as the basis for holding that oral complaints deserve
protection from retaliation. Id.at 1333.
107 Id. at 1336 (refusing to consider internal/external issue of complaint filing). The Court
did not consider the issue of who the complaint must be filed with because Saint-Gobain failed to
raise the issue in its response brief to Kasten's certiorari petition. Id.
108Id. (basing deferral of Saint-Gobain's claim on premise that oral complaints issue could
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However, in dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
asserted that they would affirm the holding of the Seventh Circuit because
internal employee complaints to the employer do not trigger FLSA Section
215(a)(3) protection. 10 9 Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority's
decision to ignore the issue of to whom the complaints need to be filed for

the employee to obtain statutory protection. 110 Rather, Justice Scalia stated
that the phrase "filed any complaint" requires a formal filing with an
agency or court."' In concluding that the statutory language of the FLSA
anti-retaliation provision was clear and unambiguous, Justice Scalia
1 12
asserted that it was not necessary to consider congressional intent.
Despite the statute's clarity, Justice Scalia, nonetheless, analyzed the
congressional intent and assumed that Congress may have refused to
provide anti-retaliation protection to internal employee complaints because
of a desire to limit employers' liability." 3 Justice Scalia further recognized
that Congress could have provided broader protection to FLSA internal
employee complaints by crafting the anti-retaliation provision with
language similar to the protection provided in Title VII.114

be decided independently). The Court asserted that "[r]esolution of the Government/private
employer question is not a 'predicate to an intelligent resolution' of the oral/written question that
we granted certiorari to decide." Id. (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis 519 U.S. 61, 75 n.13
(1996)).
109 See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336-37 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1340-41 ("[It makes little sense to consider that question at all [whether oral
complaints are protected by the statute] if neither oral nor written complaints to employers are
protected ....
").
111Id.at 1337 (asserting statute requires formal complaint filing to warrant protection). "The
plain meaning of the critical phrase and the context in which appears make clear that the
retaliation provision contemplates an official grievance filed with a court or an agency, not oral
complaints or even formal, written complaints from an employee to an employer." Id.Justice
Scalia emphasized that "every other use of the word 'complaint' in the FLSA refers to an official
filing with a governmental body." Id.Furthermore, he argued that the term "complaint," together
with the word "filed," suggested "a degree of formality consistent with legal action and
inconsistent ... with employee-to-employer complaints." Id. at 1338. Justice Scalia illuminated
his argument by noting that Congress could have provided broader employee protection if it had
substituted "made" any complaint for "filed" any complaint. Id. He also highlighted the
placement of the phrase "filed any complaint" in the same section as other protected activity that
involved governmental interaction to conclude that "filed any complaint" also required filing the
complaint with the government agency. Id.See generally Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393,
395 (1920) ("The law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar legal sense ....
").
112 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to consider FLSA's
legislative purpose). "What Congress enacted in 1938 must be applied according to its terms, and
not according to what a modem Congress (or this Court) would deem desirable." Id.
113 Id. ("Congress may not have protected intracompany complaints ...because
it was
unwilling to expose employers to the litigation, or to the inability to dismiss unsatisfactory
workers, which that additional step would entail.").
114 Id. (comparing FLSA's anti-retaliation provision to that of Title VII). Congress
enacted
Title VII with "language that unmistakably includes complaints to employers." Id.; see also 42
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. PlainMeaning of Section 510 Does Not Cover UnsolicitedEmployee
Reporting of ERISA Wrongdoing
The main rationale behind the federal circuit courts of appeals
decisions to deny anti-retaliation protection to employees who only report
alleged violations of ERISA internally to the employer is that the plain
meaning of ERISA's anti-retaliation provision found in Section 510 does

not protect such employee action. 115 Although the Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals agree that employees who make
unsolicited, internal complaints should not receive anti-retaliation
protection, these courts are split over whether employees who participate in
solicited, internal inquires should receive protection from retaliation." 6 For
example, in King, the Fourth Circuit refused to extend anti-retaliation
protection to an employee who reported alleged violations internally to the
employer because the employee did not participate in a formal inquiry or
proceeding within the plain meaning of Section 510's mandate." 7
However, in Nicolaou, the Second Circuit focused on whether the
employee's internal reporting was made in furtherance of an "inquiry"rather than the degree of formality of the inquiry-and determined that
solicited, internal complaints may warrant anti-retaliation protection while
unsolicited, internal complaints made to the employer do not trigger
statutory protection from retaliation pursuant to Section 510.'8 Likewise,

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (proscribing retaliation against employees who "oppose[] any
[unlawful] practice").
115 See, e.g., Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding
Section 510 does not protect unsolicited internal complaints based on plain reading of statute);
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328-30 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining unsolicited
internal complaints do not constitute "inquiry or proceeding"); King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337
F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding language "inquiry or proceeding" suggests limit to
protection for information given in formal proceeding).
116 Compare Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (leaving open question of whether solicited internal
complaints warrant anti-retaliation protection per Section 510), and Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328-29
(stating solicited internal complaints would warrant protection from retaliation pursuant to
Section 510), with King, 337 F.3d at 427 (holding phrase inquiry or proceeding limits protection
to information given in formal proceeding).
117 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (describing Fourth Circuit's reliance on
requisite formality of "inquiry or proceeding"). The court reasoned that including the language
"testified or about to testify," in the text of Section 510 implies that the phrase "inquiry or
proceeding" requires employees to participate in a formal legal or administrative process in order
to obtain anti-retaliation protection. King, 337 F.3d at 427.
118 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (focusing on definition of term "inquiry"
and not degree of formality of inquiry).
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in Edwards, the Third Circuit focused on whether the plaintiffs conduct
fell within the definition of "inquiry," and held that the employee's
unsolicited, internal complaint did not qualify for protection from
retaliation because the statutory language referred to inquires conducted by
the employer and not by the employee. " 9
The line of reasoning established by the Second and Third Circuit
in Nicoloau and Edwards, respectively, is proper in light of Supreme Court
precedent regarding statutory interpretation because the plain language of
Section 510's text is clear and unambiguous. 20 In Nicolaou, the Second
Circuit properly focused on the definitions of the terms "inquiry" and
"proceeding" to determine whether the employee's conduct included
participation in a proceeding or inquiry.12 1 In Edwards, the Fourth Circuit
also determined that the text of Section 510 was clear and unambiguous,
found no need to look to the statute's congressional intent, and held that the
employee did not take part in an "inquiry" because her complaint was not
in response to a request for information from the employer. 22 Unlike the
holding in King, which forecloses protection to employees who complain
internally to the employer in response to a request for information, the
Nicolaou and Edwards decisions provide protection to employees who
provide information that is solicited from the employer and deny protection
23
to employees who only provide information that is not solicited.1
Not only are the decisions in Nicolaou and Edwards appropriate
because they extend protection based on the plain meaning of Section 510
to internal, solicited complaints from employees who are asked to
participate in an employer-led investigation, but these decisions also
provide protection to individuals who blow the whistle on their employer
by reporting wrongdoing to the government, or by participating in a formal
court proceeding. 124 By extending anti-retaliation protection to internal,

119 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (asserting Section 510 protects employees

who provide information, not those who receive it).
120 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (determining plain meaning of Section 510's
statutory language is clear and unambiguous); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (addressing court's role in statutory interpretation). The
Court asserted that "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary ...
[statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Kaiser,494 U.S. at 835 (quoting
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'nv. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
121 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (focusing on when situation could be
considered inquiry not on degree of formality).
122 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (reasoning provision protects questioned
employees who provide information not employees who question and receive infornation).
123 See supra note 116 and accompanying text (comparing decisions of Second, Third, and
Fourth Circuits regarding protection afforded to internal complainants).
124 See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (providing
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solicited complaints while denying protection to unsolicited, internal
complaints, these decisions have a practical impact on employees to
encourage reporting of alleged ERISA wrongdoing to the government or an
attorney, both 2of
which are in a better position to see that any improprieties
5
are remedied. 1
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Hashimoto appears to
concede that providing protection to employees who file unsolicited,
internal complaints effectively provides whistleblower protection to the
employees "before the whistle is blown.', 126 Hashimoto and the analogous
decision in Anderson relied on a cursory analysis of the statutory language
in Section 510 to evaluate the facts of each case . 2 Such a superficial
analysis likely led each court to conclude that all internal complaints trigger
the protection of Section 510; a conclusion which seems to be based on a
pragmatic idealism for expansive protection of employee internal
complaints and which is not supported by the explicit language of Section
510.128

B. Section 510 in Light ofAnti-Retaliation Provisionsin Other Statutes
Related to the rationale discerned by the Second, Third, and Fourth
Circuits when implementing the plain meaning interpretation of Section

anti-retaliation protection for external complaints or solicited internal complaints pursuant to
Section 510); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding
external or solicited internal complaints warrant protection from retaliation pursuant to Section

510).

See supra notes 92-93, 97 and accompanying text (arguing public policy demands that
protection be afforded to employees who report ERISA wrongdoing externally). Denying
protection to internal complainants encourages employees to actually blow the whistle rather than
rely on self-help remedies between employee and employer. See supra notes 92-93, 97 and
accompanying text.
126 See Hashimoto v.Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding ERISA
Section 510 protects internal complaints of ERISA violation made to employer).
125

The normal first step in giving information or testifying in any way that
might tempt an employer to discharge one would be to present the problem
first to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan. If one is then
discharged for raising the problem, the process of giving information or
testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatorydischarge discourages
the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.
Id.(emphasis added).
127

See supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining the Fifth and Ninth Circuits'

cursory reviews of Section 510's language).
128 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards decision to deny
expansive anti-retaliation protection based on statute's plain meaning).
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510 is the notion that Congress could have provided for more expansive
anti-retaliation protection.129 Ten years prior to the enactment of ERISA,
Congress established Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
provided protection to employees from employer discrimination.130 Within
Title VII, Congress created an anti-retaliation provision that protects
employees who "opposed any practice" of the employer that is
discriminatory.' 3' In creating Section 704 of Title VII, Congress granted
employees broad protection from retaliation
for an employee's internal
32
communications with the employer. 1
In contrast, Section 510 of ERISA does not provide as broad an
anti-retaliation protection to employees as the protection found in Section
704 of Title VII, based on an interpretation of the plain meaning of each
statute. 33 Instead of providing protection to employees who "opposed any
practice deemed unlawful," Congress chose in Section 510 of ERISA to
protect only those employees who divulged information in an "inquiry or
proceeding.',134 When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, it had Section
704 of Title VII as a template, but instead chose not to extend similar
expansive protection from retaliation to employees who reported ERISA

129

See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224 (reasoning Congress could have provided similar

protection to ERISA and Title VII complainants). The court explained that Title VII's Section
704 provides broader protection from retaliation than ERISA Section 510. Id. at 223. The court
asserted that Congress could have expanded the protection afforded by Section 510 if it included
broader anti-retaliation language comparable to Title VII. Id.; King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337
F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (reasoning Section 510 anti-retaliation protection is narrower in
scope than Section 704 of Title VII).
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
131 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). The language of the Title VII anti-retaliation provision
captured in Section 704 reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id.

132 See King, 337 F.3d at 427 (noting broad anti-retaliation protection afforded pursuant to
Section 704 of Title VII).
133 See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (finding ERISA Section 510 provides more limited anti-

retaliation protection than Title VII Section 704). The court asserted that Congress could have
expanded the protection afforded by Section 510 if it included broader anti-retaliation language
comparable to Title VII. Id.
134 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (providing protection to employees who divulge
information in an "inquiry or proceeding"), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (providing
protection to employees who "opposed any practice made unlawful").
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wrongdoing internally to the employer only.' 35
C. Callingon Congress: Statutory Amendments and Solutions
In the absence of a Supreme Court holding in favor of protecting
employees who make unsolicited reports of alleged ERISA violations
internally, Congress is the proper forum for expanding the scope of Section
510 anti-retaliation protection by means of statutory amendment. 136 If
Congress were to choose to craft a more encompassing anti-retaliation
provision in ERISA, it would not need to reinvent the wheel, but rather
could look to various statutory provisions that protect employeewhistleblowers. 37 First, Congress could draw guidance from Section 704
of Title VII to protect individuals who would oppose any employment
practice that violates ERISA. 138 Second, Congress could look to the antiretaliation provision found in Sarbanes-Oxley, which explicitly protects
employees from employer retaliation for reporting various securities
violations internally. 139
Additionally, Congress could seek direction from various codified
anti-retaliation provisions at the state level. For example, the New Jersey
Conscientious Employee Protection Act explicitly protects employees from
employer retaliation for internally or externally reporting a company's
illegal acts. 140 Amending ERISA Section 510 to reflect certain provisions
of Sarbanes-Oxley, Title VII, or New Jersey's Conscientious Employee
Protection Act would likely protect against retaliation those employees who
make internal complaints, and such a revision might also assist in providing
plan fiduciaries, such as human resources directors or comptrollers, with a
method of refusing to take any action on behalf of the company that
violates ERISA, short of filing an internal or external complaint.141
135 See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224 (stating Congress chose not to provide broader protection

for ERISA whistleblowers).
136 See Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 599 (arguing Congress should enact more
expansive ERISA anti-retaliation protection for employees).
137 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (providing protection to employees who
"opposed any practice made ... unlawful"); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2011) (providing expansive anti-retaliation protection to

employees).
138
139

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
See Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 599-600 (explaining Sarbanes-Oxley protects

employee internal complaints of securities violations).
140 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2011).
141 See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2010) (reasoning
Congress could have provided broader protection for employee internal complaints similar to
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D. Practicaland Public Policy Considerationsof Section 510 's Language
When considering various aspects of public policy, ERISA reform
regarding the anti-retaliation protection afforded to employees is ripe.142
Particularly insightful are the lessons learned from the corporate crises that

led to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley-a statute that includes a broad
reaching anti-retaliation provision for internal employee complaints. 143 The
parallels between the corporate meltdowns and the potential benefit fund
predicament dictate that sufficient public policy considerations exist to
warrant Congress's reconsideration of amending ERISA to increase
protection for whistleblowers. 44 Furthermore, the immense number of

individuals and families who rely on ERISA benefit plans for their
economic well-being, as well as the implications that benefit funds have on
the national economy, only intensifies the public policy
considerations of
145
ensuring proper ERISA benefit fund administration.

The current status of anti-retaliation protection across the federal
circuits is in conflict, and the circuit split ultimately contradicts an essential
purpose behind the enactment of ERISA-to provide uniformity in the

administration of employee benefit funds across state jurisdictions. 146 The
recent trend in federal circuit courts of appeals decisions, however, limits
employee protection from retaliation for internal complaints regarding
ERISA wrongdoing on the part of the employer. 1 47 Such decisions base

Title VII); Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 599-600 ("As Congress recognized in enacting
Sarbanes-Oxley, employees are often the best situated to learn about and report evident
illegalities by companies.").
142 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (analogizing corporate crises of 1990s with
concerns surrounding ERISA).
143 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting congressional recognition of value
of
employee complaints that led to broad protection under Sarbanes-Oxley).
144 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2006) (permitting employer administered benefit funds);
Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 589-90 (recognizing employer-administered benefit plans
have potential for conflict of interest). "Indeed, the statutory scheme by its express terms and
how it has been subsequently interpreted by federal courts invites the opportunistic behavior
that eventually took down the likes of Enron and Andersen." Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90,
at 590.
145 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (expressing important individual
and
national economic considerations associated with employee benefit funds).
146 See Fort Halifax Packing Co., v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (highlighting purpose of
ERISA's enactment); supra note 36 and accompanying text.
147 See, e.g., Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding
Section 510 does not protect unsolicited internal complaints based on plain reading of statute);
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding unsolicited
internal complaints do not constitute inquiry or proceeding); King v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d
421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding "inquiry or proceeding" suggests a limit to protection for
information given in a formal proceeding).
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their holdings in sound reasoning that the statutory text is plain and
unambiguous, only providing anti-retaliation protection to employees who
report ERISA violations externally. 48
Not only do these decisions comport with the plain meaning of the
statutory language, but they also send an appropriate and important
message to employees that in order to guarantee anti-retaliation protection,
the employee must initiate an external complaint with either the
government or a plaintiffs attorney. 149 The practical implications of these
decisions are intuitive of the public policy surrounding the administration
of employee benefit plans. 50 The ERISA promulgated rules are complex,
however, employees are often situated in the best position to monitor the
plans to ensure compliance.'
By protecting only those employees who
report violations externally, these judicial decisions encourage employees
to report allegations of wrongdoing to the government or plaintiffs
attorneys, both of whom are better equipped with the necessary knowledge
and ability to remedy any impropriety; thus, reliance on the employer to
remedy employer-created violations is avoided in instances where alleged
violations are reported externally by an employee of the company.112
E. Realism or Idealism? The PotentialImpact of the Supreme Court's
Decision in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. on the
Outcome of the ERISA CircuitSplit
The Supreme Court's decision in Kasten has arguably aggravated
the divide among the federal circuits when it comes to interpreting the

148
149

See supra note 147 and accompanying text (stating holdings of recent circuit cases).
See Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 590 ("As Congress recognized in enacting

Sarbanes-Oxley, employees are often the best situated to learn about and report evident
illegalities by companies."); id.at 599-600 (highlighting limited ERISA knowledge of employees

and need to report violations to plaintiff's attorneys).
150 See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2006) (permitting employer administered benefit funds);
Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 589-90 (recognizing employer-administered benefit plans
have potential for conflict of interest). "Indeed, the statutory scheme by its express terms and
how it has been subsequently interpreted by federal courts invites the opportunistic behavior
that eventually took down the likes of Enron and Andersen." Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90,
at 590; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing importance of pensions).
151 See Bertino, supra note 92, at 904 n.253 (highlighting ERISA's complexity). "ERISA is
so complex that many attorneys hesitate to learn the statute. It is unrealistic to expect that the
average lay person could enforce his or her rights under ERISA without assistance." Id.; see also
Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 90, at 599 (highlighting congressional recognition that
employees are often in best position to discover employer wrongdoing).
152 See supra notes 92-93, 97 and accompanying text (describing difficulty of ERISA
enforcement for average employee).
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scope of anti-retaliation provisions in federal statutes.' 53
Instead of
establishing a bright-line rule pertaining to whether the anti-retaliation
provision of the FLSA covers internal employee complaints made to the
employer, or solely employee external complaints made to a governmental
agency or as part of a pending civil suit, the Court only decided that oral,
employee complaints warrant protection under the statute and declined to
answer the question of to whom employees must file a complaint to obtain

the statute's anti-retaliation protection. 154 The Court's reasoning that it is
not necessary to decide whether internal complaints should be protected at
all under the FLSA is unsound because the issue of to whom an employee
must file a complaint in order to obtain protection under the statute
is
55

outcome-determinative, similar to the ERISA anti-retaliation statute.1
In contrast, the dissent in Kasten provides the correct approach for
interpreting statutory anti-retaliation provisions and is better reasoned than
the majority opinion. Justice Scalia asserted that he would have held that
the FLSA does not protect employees from retaliation who only file
internal complaints to their employer, and he based his opinion on proper
reasoning that the plain meaning of the statutory language requires a formal
filing of the employee's grievance with a government agency. 156 Justice
Scalia's reasoning is also consistent with the reasoning of the appellate
circuits that have declined to extend ERISA anti-retaliation protection to
employees who only file internal complaints with their employers, based on
a plain reading of the statutory text. 157
Further, analogies may be discerned between Justice Scalia's

153

See supra note 110 and accompanying text (addressing counterintuitive nature of

Kasten's majority opinion). "[Ilit makes little sense to consider that question at all [whether oral
complaints are protected by the statute] if neither oral nor written complaints to employers are
protected." Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Perfornance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1341 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
154 See supra note 104 and accompanying text (explaining Court granted certiorari
solely to
decide protection afforded to oral complaints); supra note 106 and accompanying text (stating
Court's holding that oral complaints are protected pursuant to the FLSA); supra note 107 and
accompanying text (declining to rule on whether internal employee complaints are protected from
anti-retaliation).
155 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (delineating Court's rational for refusing
to rule on with whom employee complaints must be filed). Compare Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1336
("Resolution of the Government/private employer question is not a' " 'predicate to an intelligent
resolution' " ' of the oral/written question that we granted certiorari to decide."), with Kasten, 131
S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t makes little sense to consider [whether oral complaints
are protected by the statute] at all in the present case if neither oral nor written complaints to
employers are protected .... ).
156 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (establishing basis for Scalia's assertion
that
complaints must be filed with government for protection).
157 See supra note 147 (noting circuits that have declined to extend ERISA).
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dissent in Kasten regarding the FLSA and some of the ERISA circuits, both
of which have denied broad employee anti-retaliation protection based on
the premise that Congress could have provided expansive employee antiretaliation protection for internal complaints.158 Even more telling on the
issue of congressional intent regarding the scope of employee statutory
protection from retaliation in the case of the enactment of ERISA is that
Congress had the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as a template, while the FLSA was enacted prior to Title
VII" 59 This demonstrates that Congress was aware of broad language to
protect employees, but instead chose to provide narrow protection from
retaliation under ERISA. 160 Regardless of the congressional reasoning for
not providing employees with anti-retaliation protection for internal
complaints of alleged ERISA violations made to the employer, a plain
reading of the statutory language makes clear that internal complaints are
not sufficient to trigger anti-retaliation protection. 161 If Justice Scalia's
dissent in Kasten, and the federal appeals courts' decisions in Nicolaou,
King, and Edwards, are indicative of how other circuits may interpret the
scope of anti-retaliation protection under ERISA, as well as how the
Supreme Court may rule, plaintiffs counsel should advise employees to
"play through the whistle" and report any improprieties to the government
in order to ensure protection from employer retaliation.
V. CONCLUSION
Employees

who

discover

employer

wrongdoing

in

the

158 See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1337-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating Congress could have

provided broader protection to employees from retaliation). Justice Scalia properly recognized
that Congress could have substituted "made" any complaint for "filed any complaint" to provide
more expansive employee anti-retaliation protection. Id; see also Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224
(reasoning Congress could have provided broader protection for employee internal complaints
similar to Title VII).
159 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (providing protection to employees who oppose
an employer action that Act deems unlawful), with 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (providing protection
for employees who partake in proceeding or inquiry), and 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006)
(protecting employees who file complaint or provide testimony).
160 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (arguing Congress could have provided
broader ERISA anti-retaliation protection but chose not to).
161 See Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Congress may not have protected
intracompany complaints ... because it was unwilling to expose employers to the litigation, or to
the inability to dismiss unsatisfactory workers, which that additional step would entail."); supra
notes 111, 157 and accompanying text (arguing plain reading of FLSA and ERISA warrant
conclusion that internal complaints are not protected); supra notes 149-52 (arguing public policy
and practical considerations warrant narrow employee protection to encourage government
filings).
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administration of an employee benefit plan will surely find themselves in
an undesirable predicament. They might choose a route of inaction, thus
risking harm to their benefit fund. Alternatively, they might choose to
complain internally to the employer's administration, with the hope that the
employer will self-correct the impropriety. However, in the latter situation,
employees risk adverse employment action and even termination at the
hands of a vindictive employer. Finally, employees might seek to enforce
their rights and ensure the integrity of their benefit plan by seeking the
assistance of the government or an attorney who can take action to remedy
any employer wrongdoing.
Essentially, the safest option available, and the advice that
plaintiffs attorneys should strongly consider, is that employees should
report the alleged violations externally, with the hope that sufficient action
will be taken to remedy any wrongdoing. If an employee chooses this
course, although he or she cannot prevent employer retaliation, that
employee will enjoy legal protection under ERISA Section 510.
Furthermore, that employee will also increase the chance that the violations
will be rectified once reviewed by competent attorneys or investigators. If
the employees choose to do nothing, however, the potential for harm to
both individual economic situations and the national economy is greatly
increased. The recent trend of limited whistleblower protection across the
federal circuits in response to a plain reading of the statute, and preemption
of any meaningful state law claims, leaves employees exposed to
irremediable adverse employment action if complaints are made solely to
the employer.
Ultimately, Congress must take action to effect any real and
meaningful change to provide employees with greater protection from
retaliation for ERISA-related complaints. Sufficient public policy reasons
exist for Congress to take another look and amend ERISA's whistleblower
protection in light of other federal and state anti-retaliation provisions.
However, until Congress acts, the federal courts should require, and
attorneys should encourage, employees to "blow the whistle" by reporting
alleged ERISA violations externally if they wish to enjoy protection from
retaliation.
Such a mandate serves to further the public policy
considerations by facilitating the flow of information of alleged ERISA
violations. Additionally, it also encourages those employees who are in the
best position to discover and report alleged violations, to take the necessary
steps to ensure their economic well-being by providing information to the
government and capable private attorneys who are in the best position to
rectify any wrongdoing. Such advice comports with the plain meaning of
the statutory language. Until the circuit split is resolved, or Congress
amends the anti-retaliation protection, employees should "play through the
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whistle" and report alleged ERISA violations externally in order to obtain
protection and recourse from retaliation at the hands of vindictive
employers.
James Coughlin

